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297 
CEMENTING GOOD LAW BY TOLERATING 
BAD OUTCOMES: EXAMINING THE EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT’S COMMITMENT TO UPHOLDING 
THE DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
FOR PRISON OFFICIALS IN KULKAY v. ROY 
Abstract: On February 2, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
decided Kulkay v. Roy and affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota’s dismissal of plaintiff’s civil rights claims under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The plaintiff, a former inmate at a Minnesota correctional 
facility, sued the correctional facility and related officials for failing to install 
safety features on a piece of machinery and not providing him with adequate us-
age training after he suffered damage to his hand while operating the beam saw. 
The district court held that the plaintiff inmate failed to state a claim under the 
Eighth Amendment due to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed this 
decision, holding that the prison officials did not exhibit deliberate indifference 
and therefore were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. The Eighth Cir-
cuit based this reasoning in the fact that the plaintiff failed to show that the prison 
officials acted with deliberate indifference towards his health or safety. This 
comment argues that the Eighth Circuit was correct in re-emphasizing its com-
mitment to the standard of deliberate indifference because the underlying policy 
motivations for the defense of qualified immunity dictate that a few bad out-
comes, such as plaintiffs not receiving damages for harm caused to them, be tol-
erated in order to cement an otherwise good law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a 
citizen of the United States should not be subjected to “cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.”1 The founders who wrote the Constitution thought this was of such 
paramount importance that they included it as one of the first ten amendments 
in the Bill of Rights.2 Today, plaintiffs frequently assert claims of Eighth 
Amendment violations in the prison confinement context.3 A subset of these 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 2 See id.; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and 
the Founders’ Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1261, 1281 (1989) (discussing further the Founders’ original intentions behind the Bill of 
Rights). George Mason wrote a letter at the Virginia Ratifying Convention in 1788 arguing that the 
Bill of Rights is needed because it is an important way to “secure the liberties and happiness of the 
people.” 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 793 (1971). 
 3 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (discussing the Eighth Amendment in relation 
to an allegation that a prisoner was beaten by several prison officials while being transported from his 
cell); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99–101 (1976) (discussing the Eighth Amendment in relation to 
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claims specifically involves injuries that take place while inmates are partici-
pating in their prison work assignments.4  
In Kulkay v. Roy, plaintiff Steven Kulkay, a former inmate at a Minnesota 
correctional facility, sued the correctional facility and several employees, as-
serting an Eighth Amendment violation after he was injured using a beam saw 
in his prison work assignment.5 Kulkay argued that because the correctional 
facility never installed the beam saw’s safety guard, or formally trained him on 
how to operate the saw, there was an “objectively serious risk of harm” and 
that the prison officials knew of this risk.6 The case was ultimately dismissed 
on the basis of qualified immunity for the prison officials, because Kulkay 
failed to show that the prison officials’ state of mind constituted deliberate in-
difference toward the health and safety of the inmate plaintiff.7 
The defense of qualified immunity is a well-established doctrine that has 
multiple policy perspectives and impacts.8 In order to defeat the defense of 
qualified immunity in the contexts of prisons, a plaintiff must meet the stand-
ard of deliberate indifference.9 Part I of this Comment both explains the stand-
ard of deliberate indifference, and explains the technical and policy aspects of 
the defense of qualified immunity.10 Part II of this Comment then discusses the 
                                                                                                                           
an allegation that a prisoner received improper medical care after sustaining an injury while in prison). 
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are not only forbidden from physically abusing prison-
ers, they are also obligated to care for the basic needs of the prisoner (i.e. food, shelter, and clothing). 
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
 4 See Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 2017); Franklin v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 160 
F. App’x 730, 733–36 (10th Cir. 2005); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 5 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 641. Kulkay had been operating the beam saw without any formal training 
from prison officials for one month prior to his injury, which occurred on August 5, 2013. Id. A beam 
saw is a “large, stationary machine that uses computers to automatically move and cut wood beams.” 
Id. at 640. 
 6 Id. at 643. 
 7 Id. at 644. 
 8 See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (discussing the necessity for qualified 
immunity for public officials in order to allow them to perform the duties of their job); Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (reasoning that qualified immunity exists in order to limit the 
amount of litigation to which public officials are subjected); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 
(1982) (stating that one reason for qualified immunity is to encourage people to take jobs in public 
service by affording them greater protection from suit). Some of these policy perspectives include 
shielding public officials from liability and encouraging people to go into public service careers by 
affording them extra protection while performing their job duties. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 (fo-
cusing on allowing public officials to perform their job duties free from suit); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 
(highlighting the non-monetary costs of exposing public officials to litigation). As an example of the 
interaction between qualified immunity and a public official that is not a prison official, one can look 
towards some scholarship on the defense’s relation to the Vice President. See generally James D. 
Myers, Bringing the Vice President Into the Fold: Executive Immunity and the Vice Presidency, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 897 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled whether the Vice 
President can claim absolute immunity as a defense, or whether the Vice President is limited only to 
qualified immunity). 
 9 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The standard of deliberate indifference is essentially the equivalent of 
criminal law recklessness. Id. at 839–40. 
 10 See infra notes 13–70 and accompanying text. 
2018] Qualified Immunity for Prison Officials 299 
specific facts of Kulkay v. Roy, and how it is relevant to the standard of delib-
erate indifference.11 Lastly, Part III illustrates the specifics surrounding the 
deliberate indifference standard in the prison context, and argues that it is nec-
essary to uphold the underlying policy motivations of the defense of qualified 
immunity.12  
I. THE TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE 
POLICY MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE DEFENSE 
 The defense of qualified immunity is well established in law, as are the 
policy motivations behind the existence of the defense.13 Section A of this Part 
examines the more technical aspects of qualified immunity, including the de-
liberate indifference standard and how it is applied to prison officials.14 Section 
B of this Part highlights several of the main policy reasons behind qualified 
immunity that help illustrate why courts have continually acknowledged it as a 
valid defense for various public officials, including prison officials.15  
A. Legal Framework for Analyzing a Defense of Qualified Immunity 
The common law defense of qualified immunity is available to certain pub-
lic officials in an attempt to allow them to carry out their duties without fear of 
facing a lawsuit for exercising discretion.16 This defense balances the competing 
interests of giving citizens a remedy for relief when their rights have been violat-
ed by the government, while also making it possible for officials to do their jobs 
without constantly facing the high burdens of litigation.17 The defense of quali-
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 71–95 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 96–120 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (describing the burdens of discovery and 
trial as the motivating factor behind qualified immunity for public officials); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 
223 (discussing the necessity for qualified immunity for public officials in order to allow them to 
perform the duties of their job); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (reasoning that qualified immunity exists in 
order to limit the amount of litigation to which public officials are subjected); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
807 (stating that one reason for qualified immunity is to encourage people to take jobs in public ser-
vice by affording them greater protection from suit). 
 14 See infra notes 16–51 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 52–70 and accompanying text. 
 16 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. Harlow explains that officials with “complex discretionary responsi-
bilities”—including prosecutors, governors, and governor’s aides—need to be afforded a high level of 
protection from suit. Id. The original defense of qualified immunity was enacted by statute and only 
available to judicial officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was later developed to include other public 
officials through a number of cases. See id. at 818 (discussing the evolution of immunity, beginning 
with absolute immunity for judges and extending to qualified immunity for government officials); 
Mitchell v. Shearrer, 729 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2013) (clarifying the defense of qualified immuni-
ty in a case where an arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, but his assisting officers 
were). 
 17 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504–05 (1978) (noting that the main problem with allow-
ing officials to have immunity lies in the inability of damaged plaintiffs to recover for violations of 
their constitutional rights). 
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fied immunity is not an absolute defense and will only shield public and gov-
ernment officials if the qualified immunity defense analysis is satisfied.18 In or-
der to overcome a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must meet both 
prongs of a two-prong test.19 First, a plaintiff must show that there has been a 
violation of a constitutional or statutory right.20 Second, that right has to be 
clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.21 If a plain-
tiff fails either of these prongs, the defendant will be entitled to qualified immun-
ity.22 
One particularly prevalent application of the qualified immunity defense is 
in the prison confinement setting, as inmates frequently sue prisons and their 
employees for civil rights violations.23 To successfully state an Eighth Amend-
ment claim, a common example of a civil rights violation inmates assert, an in-
mate must satisfy two standards: one objective and one subjective.24 Regarding 
the objective standard, the inmate plaintiff must show that the alleged violation 
is “objectively and sufficiently serious” so as to be considered cruel and unusual 
punishment.25 Courts have held that a violation is objectively and sufficiently 
serious if an inmate either experiences actual harm or is exposed to a likely risk 
of harm.26 As for the subjective standard, an inmate plaintiff must demonstrate 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (finding that “government officials performing discretionary func-
tions [are generally] shielded from liability for civil damages . . .” if the qualified immunity test is 
satisfied); Mitchell, 729 F.3d at 1074 (clarifying that qualified immunity will be granted to a public 
official “unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of 
which a reasonable person would have known”). Absolute immunity is distinct from qualified immun-
ity in that it is generally only available to legislators when acting in their legislative capacity or to 
certain executive officials, such as the President of the United States. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 
(discussing the defense of absolute immunity). Absolute immunity is a much more powerful defense, 
as it provides a complete immunity from suit, whereas qualified immunity only provides limited im-
munity. See id. (discussing the fundamental difference between absolute and qualified immunity). 
 19 Mitchell, 729 F.3d at 1074. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See Ransom v. Grisafe, 790 F.3d 804, 812 n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that because the court 
found that the police officers did not violate any constitutional rights of the plaintiff, the court need 
not make a ruling on whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the inci-
dent). 
 23 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4–5 (discussing the Eighth Amendment in relation to an allegation that 
a prisoner was beaten by several prison officials while being transported from his cell); Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 99–101 (discussing the Eighth Amendment in relation to an allegation that a prisoner received 
improper medical care after sustaining an injury while in prison). 
 24 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 846. Farmer also focuses on an Eighth Amendment claim in the 
prison context. Id. at 829. The case involved a transsexual prisoner filing a claim against prison offi-
cials for being violently assaulted in prison. Id. at 829–31. Farmer helped clarify the test for deliberate 
indifference that is followed by all circuits today when evaluating a qualified immunity defense. See 
id. at 847 (finding that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . only if 
he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk”). 
 25 Id. at 834. 
 26 See id. (finding that “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm”). Examples of a substantial risk of serious harm include an inmate 
being assigned to a room with a second inmate who is known to have sexually assaulted other in-
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that the public official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”27 For 
the prison work assignment context, that state of mind is deliberate indiffer-
ence.28 
 The underlying rationale for the deliberate indifference standard is that an 
Eighth Amendment violation should only be found when there is an “unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain.”29 But, prior to 1994, there was a disagree-
ment between the circuits about what the term deliberate indifference meant.30 In 
1994, the U.S. Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan clarified that deliberate in-
difference meant a mens rea of something more than negligence and less than 
purposeful or knowing; namely, it required the equivalent of criminal law reck-
lessness.31 In recognizing that this definition leaves much to be desired in terms 
of specificity, courts identified two elements for deliberate indifference, requir-
ing an inmate plaintiff to show (1) that an official had actual knowledge of a 
substantial risk to the inmate’s health or safety, and (2) that the given official 
failed to respond as a reasonable person would have responded to the risk in that 
situation.32 
The first element clearly requires that a given defendant official have actual 
knowledge of the risk.33 Actual knowledge is separate and distinct from con-
structive knowledge because it requires an official to be conscious of a substan-
tial risk, whereas constructive knowledge requires only that the official should 
                                                                                                                           
mates, a correctional officer making verbal death threats to an inmate, and multiple paraplegic inmates 
being placed in solitary confinement for more than a day without access to food or medical care. Nel-
son v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 447 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing inmate’s prior sexual assaults); Irving 
v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing verbal death threats); Simmons v. Cook, 
154 F.3d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing paraplegic inmates). 
 27 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that “[e]xcessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”). 
 30 See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360–61 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that deliberate indiffer-
ence requires that an actor know or should have known about a sufficiently serious danger, thereby 
lowering the bar to meet the deliberate indifference standard); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 
349 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that deliberate indifference involves a subjective standard of reckless-
ness). This circuit split was resolved in Farmer in 1994. 511 U.S. at 839–40. 
 31 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–40. The term “mens rea” refers to the mental state of a defendant 
when they are committing the act with which they are charged. See Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (providing a variety of descriptive phrases for mens rea and discussing more 
broadly the concept of mental culpability for crimes). 
 32 See Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007) (setting out the two elements of deliber-
ate indifference). 
 33 Id. Again, this is based on the underlying reasoning that there must be a wanton infliction of 
pain in order to have an Eighth Amendment violation. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (finding that “only the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment”); Young, 508 F.3d at 
873 (requiring the standard of deliberate indifference based on the Constitution’s requirement of an 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” in order to violate the Eighth Amendment). 
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be aware of such a risk.34 In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit provided an example of what it means for an official to have actual 
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm in Young v. Selk.35 There, the court held 
that when a prisoner told officials about threats he had received from another 
prisoner, the officials had actual knowledge of a substantial risk.36 The court im-
plicitly reasoned that a prison official that has a direct conversation with a pris-
oner about a potential risk has actual knowledge of it.37 
The second element is that the official must have failed to respond as a rea-
sonable person would have responded to the risk in that situation.38 Looking 
again to Young, the court ruled that there was evidence to support a finding that 
the prison officials acted unreasonably.39 There was some evidence suggesting 
that the officials did not take any action in response to the information provided 
by the prisoner.40 The court held that even if it were true that the prison officials 
had told the prisoner to file a formal complaint about the threat, they knew full 
well that these complaints are processed slowly, thus leaving the prisoner open 
to harm in the meantime.41 
Providing further detail and clarification to the context of prison work as-
signments, a prison official acts with deliberate indifference towards an inmate’s 
health or safety when they ask an inmate to work on a job that they are incapable 
of doing or that both creates a danger to them and is particularly painful.42 Addi-
tionally, the official’s state of mind is considered at the time of the alleged viola-
tion and not from a later point in time.43 Once time has passed and more infor-
mation has appeared, the risk has clearly come to fruition and it is unfair to ex-
pect prison officials to predict the future with any degree of certainty.44 
 The standard of deliberate indifference in the prison work assignment con-
text is one that has been discussed frequently by courts, both in the Eighth Cir-
cuit and elsewhere.45 Within the Eighth Circuit, courts generally follow the de-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that constructive knowledge, 
referred to as the “should have known standard,” does not overcome the standard of deliberate indif-
ference that is required to find an Eighth Amendment violation in a prison setting). 
 35 Young, 508 F.3d at 873–74. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 873. 
 39 Id. at 874. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1078–79 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sanchez v. Taggart, 144 
F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1998)) (holding that a prison official who instructed an inmate to put out a 
fire near a live, low-hanging power line that the official knew was dangerous amounted to deliberate 
indifference). 
 43 Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 993 n.1 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 44 Id. The element of deliberate indifference is to be evaluated “at the time in question, not with 
hindsight’s perfect vision.” Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 45 See Franklin, 160 F. App’x at 733–36 (holding that negligence of prison officials does not 
constitute deliberate indifference); Warren v. Missouri, 995 F.2d 130, 130 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding 
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liberate indifference standard when deciding whether or not a qualified immuni-
ty defense is available, including when the Eighth Amendment is involved.46 
There have been many cases in which government officials have been able to 
avoid liability for damages because the deliberate indifference standard was not 
met, and the defense of qualified immunity was granted.47 In 1996, the Eighth 
Circuit in Stephens v. Johnson granted a defense of qualified immunity for the 
chief administrator of a prison work program.48 The court reasoned that the offi-
cial’s failure to address unsafe work conditions that led to the injury of several 
prisoners was at most negligent behavior, and could not amount to deliberate 
indifference.49 The Eighth Circuit has also consistently held that failure to install 
safety devices on prison work assignment devices does not amount to deliberate 
indifference.50 In each of these instances, the Eighth Circuit has granted the de-
fense of qualified immunity for a public official due to a plaintiff’s failure to sat-
isfy the standard of deliberate indifference.51 
B. Policy Motivations for the Defense of Qualified Immunity 
There have been a number of cases that discuss and explain the policy mo-
tivations behind the defense of qualified immunity for public officials and how 
they have evolved over time.52 One of the original justifications behind the qual-
                                                                                                                           
qualified immunity when a plaintiff failed to show prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference 
towards the prisoner’s medical problems); Bibbs v. Armontrout, 943 F.2d 26, 27 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the negligence of prison officials does not satisfy the standard of deliberate indifference 
required to defeat qualified immunity). 
 46 See Franklin, 160 F. App’x at 733–36; Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31; Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly discussed the deliberate indifference standard and subsequently 
bound all circuit courts to apply this standard when evaluating a defense of qualified immunity. See 
Farmer 511 U.S. at 834 (holding that the standard of deliberate indifference in the prison context 
essentially amounts to criminal law recklessness); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding that a prisoner 
making an Eighth Amendment claim must show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference 
towards the prisoner’s medical problems to defeat qualified immunity). 
 47 See Stephens v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 198, 200–01 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the chief adminis-
trator of a prison work program did not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to remedy unsafe 
work conditions that caused injuries to several prisoners, as it only amounted to negligence); Warren, 
995 F.2d at 130–31 (holding that prison officials did not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to 
install safety devices on a saw that caused injuries to a prisoner); Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27 (holding that 
several prison officials did not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to install safety devices on an 
ink machine that caused a prisoner damage to his fingers). 
 48 Stephens, 83 F.3d at 200–01. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31 (holding that prison officials did not exhibit deliberate indif-
ference by failing to install safety devices on a saw that caused injuries to a prisoner); Bibbs, 943 F.2d 
at 27 (holding that several prison officials did not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to install 
safety devices on an ink machine that caused a prisoner damage to his fingers). 
 51 Stephens, 83 F.3d at 200–01; Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31; Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27. 
 52 See, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (describing the burdens of trial and discovery as motivating 
factors behind granting public officials the defense of qualified immunity); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 
(holding that absolute immunity was denied for a state court judge accused of violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of a probation officer by firing her based on sex); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (hold-
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ified immunity defense is that it allows government officials to perform the du-
ties of their job without fear of being sued.53 In 1967, the Supreme Court first 
declared in Pierson v. Ray that law enforcement personal would be granted the 
defense of qualified immunity on the grounds that they needed protection from 
financial liability for their actions.54 This sole justification for qualified immuni-
ty was later expanded to include several other policy motivations.55  
In that case, one of the primary concerns the Court had with public officials 
is that they only have a limited amount of time and energy to spend on the public 
issues that are the main focus of their jobs.56 It is well established that govern-
ment officials are charged with making numerous decisions at any given time, 
and these decisions can impact a large number of people.57 As such, the Court 
reasoned it would not be advantageous for public officials to constantly grapple 
with the distractions that are associated with a lawsuit.58 In 1997, the Court 
backtracked slightly on its motivations behind qualified immunity in Richardson 
v. McKnight, when it explained that the mere chance that a public official might 
be distracted by a lawsuit is not sufficient by itself to warrant the defense.59  
Fortunately, the Supreme Court later clarified the motivations behind the 
defense of qualified immunity through several cases in 2009.60 The Court explic-
                                                                                                                           
ing that qualified immunity was granted for the Attorney General accused of violating federal rights of 
a plaintiff by intercepting telephone calls). Although some of these cases are discussing absolute im-
munity for judges and executive officials (i.e. President of the United States), the underlying policy 
motivations are the same for qualified immunity for prison officials. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 
(discussing the broad policy motivations behind qualified immunity and implying that it applies to any 
public official); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 (discussing the policy motivations behind absolute immun-
ity for various executive officials). 
 53 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223; Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526. Two popular counterarguments to 
qualified immunity are that lawsuits are intended to (1) repay victims for some harm they experienced 
and (2) act as a deterrent for a certain, unfavorable type of behavior. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223. If 
government officials have protection against suit, there will be no way for victims of some harm to 
obtain monetary damages from the government official who caused the harm. See id.; Forsyth, 472 
U.S. at 526. 
 54 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (noting that a fundamental motivation behind 
qualified immunity is to protect officials from financial liability). 
 55 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (expanding the underlying policy motivations for the defense of 
qualified immunity). 
 56 See id. (reasoning that public officials often have “pressing public issues” to attend to, and that 
subjecting them to the burdens of litigation would inhibit their ability to focus on those issues). 
 57 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223. 
 58 Id. The burdens of litigation, particularly discovery, are well known, and alleviating public 
officials from them in all but those cases where the official acted with deliberate indifference is better 
for society. See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (discussing the burdens and costs of litigation on public 
officials and implying that qualified immunity is necessary in order to avoid those costs); Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 816 (discussing the “substantial costs” of exposing public officials to litigation). 
 59 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997) (reasoning that private prison guards 
who might be distracted by the possibility of a lawsuit against them did not warrant the granting of a 
defense of qualified immunity).  
 60 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (discussing the “heavy costs” associated with 
litigation and finding that public officials might be better served by spending their time and energy 
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itly named the burdens of discovery and trial as the key motivating factors be-
hind the defense of qualified immunity.61 In doing so, the Court reasoned that 
because public officials only have a limited amount of time and energy to spend 
on issues that impact a great number of people, leaving them open to a great 
number of lawsuits would not result in an efficient allocation of their re-
sources.62 
A slightly less prevalent policy motivation behind qualified immunity is 
that without this protection, people would be discouraged from taking jobs as 
public officials.63 If public officials were not afforded the defense of qualified 
immunity, they would face a great deal of liability because of the discretionary 
nature of their job.64 These policy motivations are particularly evident in the 
context of law enforcement, specifically with prison officials, as they are 
charged with the difficult task of watching numerous inmates and ensuring their 
safety.65 If the job duties of an official include protecting the safety of the public, 
either by apprehending criminals or by keeping them in custody, it is important 
for those officials to have the utmost protection.66 Without the protection of 
qualified immunity, it would be difficult to find people to perform the duties of 
                                                                                                                           
elsewhere); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (describing the burdens of discovery and trial as the motivating 
factor behind qualified immunity for public officials). 
 61 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (discussing the burdens of litigation and the impact they can have on 
public officials); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (describing the time and energy of litigation as the primary 
reason behind the defense of qualified immunity). 
 62 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (explaining that public officials might be better served by not having 
to spend their time and energy on litigation); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (clarifying the policy motiva-
tions behind the defense of qualified immunity). 
 63 See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (discussing the possibility that without the protection of qualified 
immunity, people might be dissuaded from taking a job as a public official). 
 64 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (discussing the importance of providing executive officials “who 
are required to exercise their discretion” with “greater protection than those with less complex discre-
tionary responsibilities”). 
 65 Correctional Officer Job Bulletin, RICE COUNTY, MINN. (Jan. 24, 2017), http://agency.
governmentjobs.com/rice/job_bulletin.cfm?JobID=1640133 [https://perma.cc/NA6T-62SR] (stating 
the job duties required of a correctional officer); see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227 (holding that a 
police officer who entered the residence of a suspected drug dealer without a warrant was entitled to 
qualified immunity); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605–06 (1999) (holding that police officers who 
brought reporters along on the execution of a search warrant were entitled to qualified immunity). 
Both Pearson and Layne were decided on the grounds that the alleged violations of a constitutional 
right were not clearly established at the time of the incident. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243–44; Layne, 526 
U.S. at 605–06. In ruling this way, the Supreme Court placed an emphasis on giving law enforcement 
officers the benefit of the doubt and more freedom to carry out the duties of their job. Pearson, 555 
U.S. 243–44; Layne, 526 U.S. 605–06. 
 66 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (granting the defense of qualified immunity for police officers in 
an alleged Fourth Amendment violation); Layne, 526 U.S. at 615–16 (upholding the defense of quali-
fied immunity for police officers). In affording the protection of qualified immunity, the Court in 
Layne spent a great deal of time explaining its reasoning and seemed to take great measures to ensure 
that the police officers were afforded this protection. See 526 U.S. at 615–16 (narrowing the question 
to whether a police officer at this exact point in time would have believed it was reasonable and indi-
cating that this is a difficult question in order to afford the officers the utmost protection). 
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various public officials as they would likely face numerous lawsuits and con-
stantly be subjected to the significant time burdens of discovery and trial.67 
It is important to understand the broad policy motivations behind the de-
fense of qualified immunity because it helps explain why the defense exists in 
the first place, namely to afford protection to public officials and allow them to 
perform the duties of their job free from the extra burdens of litigation.68 It also 
clarifies the establishment of the standard of deliberate indifference as a means 
to ensure that protection to officials.69 Finally, it follows logically that the stand-
ard of deliberate indifference is ultimately necessary to protect public officials 
because if the bar were any lower, it would result in more litigation against pub-
lic officials for simply performing their job duties.70 
II. EXAMINING KULKAY V. ROY AND ITS APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
 Courts have faced many difficult decisions regarding whether or not to 
grant the defense of qualified immunity for public officials, particularly when 
an inmate suffers bodily harm while under the supervision of a prison offi-
cial.71 This Part begins by discussing the decision made by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Kulkay v. Roy.72 Next, it provides more in-
formation on the relevant facts of Kulkay that the Eighth Circuit used to come 
to its decision.73 This Part concludes by explaining how the Eighth Circuit ap-
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (naming explicitly the burdens of discovery and trial as the key 
motivations behind the defense of qualified immunity); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 (explaining that 
public officials bear the burdens and costs of litigation); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 525–26 (discussing the 
burdens and costs of litigation on public officials and implying that qualified immunity is necessary in 
order to avoid those costs); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (discussing the significant costs of exposing 
public officials to litigation). 
 68 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (discussing the policy motivations behind qualified immunity); 
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 (explaining that the importance of qualified immunity lies in providing 
protection to officials performing the duties of their job); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (reasoning that 
keeping public officials focused on their job duties and not having them distracted by a lawsuit is an 
important justification for qualified immunity). 
 69 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (explaining that the standard of deliberate indifference is the state 
of mind required of prison officials in order for qualified immunity to be defeated); Young, 508 F.3d 
at 873 (noting that the motivation behind the standard of deliberate indifference is consistent with the 
idea that only an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 70 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (explaining the standard of deliberate indifference); Forrester, 
484 U.S. at 223 (explaining that the importance of qualified immunity lies in not exposing public 
officials to the burdens of litigation). 
 71 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (granting qualified immunity for po-
lice officers accused of violating a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 838 (1994) (granting qualified immunity for prison officials and explaining the deliberate indif-
ference standard); Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 645 (8th Cir. 2017) (granting prison officials quali-
fied immunity for alleged Eighth Amendment violations). 
 72 See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
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plied the deliberate indifference standard before granting the prison officials a 
defense of qualified immunity.74  
In 2017, the Eighth Circuit decided Kulkay v. Roy, and held that showing 
that there were unsafe prison work conditions does not, on its own, prove that 
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference with regard to inmate health or 
safety.75 The court found that there were no facts asserting that the prison offi-
cials had actual knowledge of the risk to Kulkay and therefore upheld the dis-
missal of the case based on the defense of qualified immunity.76 
The Eighth Circuit joined several other circuits in establishing a similar 
precedent.77 Kulkay brought claims against the prison officials alleging viola-
tions of his Eighth Amendment rights, Fourteenth Amendment rights, and claims 
of negligence based on allegations that there were no safety guards on the beam 
saw and that he never received proper training on how to operate it.78 Procedur-
ally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the prison offi-
cials’ motion to dismiss the claims on the grounds that Kulkay failed to state a 
claim for which relief could be granted.79 Kulkay appealed, arguing that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing his Eighth Amendment claims and the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed.80 
The facts of Kulkay are relatively straightforward.81 Steven Kulkay was 
working in the Faribault, Minnesota correctional facility’s industrial workshop 
and was tasked with operating a beam saw.82 After just one month of operating 
the beam saw, Kulkay completely severed three of his fingers and partially sev-
ered a fourth finger, sustaining full and permanent damage to his three fingers 
and partial damage to the fourth finger.83 He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
 75 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 645. 
 76 Id. at 644, 646. 
 77 See id. at 645 (upholding qualified immunity for prison officials because the standard of delib-
erate indifference was not met); Franklin v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 160 F. App’x 730, 733–36 (10th Cir. 
2005) (holding that mere negligence of prison officials does not amount to deliberate indifference for 
the purposes of defeating a qualified immunity defense); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257–58 
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a prison not in compliance with ideal safety precautions does not amount 
to an Eighth Amendment violation and awarding the prison officials qualified immunity). 
 78 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 641. 
 79 Id. at 640. The applicable rule used by the prison officials to make this argument is Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 
 80 Id. at 640, 646. 
 81 See id. at 640–41. Kulkay was incarcerated for first-degree burglary of an occupied dwelling 
house and offering a forged check. Minnesota Public Criminal History, MINN. BUREAU CRIM. AP-
PREHENSION, https://cch.state.mn.us (Mar. 14, 2018) (follow “Begin Search” hyperlink; then search 
for Kulkay, Steven, DOB: 02/17/1981). The facts are straightforward insofar as the events were ap-
parent and relatively uncontested at the trial court level and the prison officials’ main argument is that 
Kulkay’s claims were barred by qualified immunity. See Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 641. 
 82 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 640. 
 83 Id. at 641. Kulkay alleged that he was injured because the prison officials never installed the 
safety guards on the beam saw. Id. Doctors were not able to undo the damage and reattach Kulkay’s 
severed fingers. Id. 
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§ 1983 against the prison officials for violating his civil rights, specifically vio-
lating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.84 The prison officials filed, and 
the trial court granted, a motion to dismiss on the grounds that any Fourteenth 
Amendment claims could only be brought as Eighth Amendment claims, and 
that the Eighth Amendment claims were barred because the prison officials were 
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.85 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota found that Kulkay 
failed to state an Eighth Amendment violation based upon the doctrine of quali-
fied immunity.86 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit did not discuss the merits of 
whether or not the harm that Kulkay faced was objectively and sufficiently seri-
ous.87 Instead, the court operated under the assumption that asking Kulkay to 
operate a beam saw without any safety guards or formal training was “objective-
ly and sufficiently serious,” and instead decided the case based on the second 
showing requirement.88 The Eighth Circuit held that Kulkay failed to allege facts 
indicating that the prison officials’ state of mind amounted to deliberate indiffer-
ence.89 The court found that the mere fact that there were state and federal safety 
regulations in place that required guards on the beam saws was not enough to 
establish deliberate indifference.90  
The Eighth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning established by the 
Supreme Court in 1994, in Farmer v. Brennan, holding that it is not enough of 
an error to amount to a violation of a constitutional right if a prison official fails 
to remove a risk that the prison official should have known about.91 The two-
prong test for qualified immunity requires that there be both a violation of a con-
stitutional right and that the right be clearly established.92 In Kulkay, the Eighth 
Circuit held that there was no violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. Section 1983 holds any person who deprives another person of a constitutional right liable 
for civil damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Kulkay also brought negligence claims against the prison 
officials, but these claims are not part of the key holding and will not be discussed. Kulkay, 847 F.3d 
at 641. 
 85 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 641. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment 
when dealing with state, not federal actions. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1964). Therefore, any 
claims Kulkay had concerning the rights protected by the Eighth Amendment could only be made 
under that amendment, and not the Fourteenth Amendment. Kulkay 847 F.3d at 641. Kulkay’s negli-
gence claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. 
 86 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 64. 
 87 Id. at 644. 
 88 Id. at 644–45. The court was clear in its opinion that by assuming the risk of harm the plaintiff 
faced was objectively and sufficiently serious, it in no way made any binding decision as to this mat-
ter. Id. 
 89 Id. at 644. 
 90 Id. at 645. Here, Kulkay failed to allege any facts that established that the prison officials acted 
with deliberate indifference towards his health or safety by failing to instruct him how to operate the 
beam saw or by failing to install the safety guards on it. Id. at 646. 
 91 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (granting qualified immunity for prison officials and explaining 
the deliberate indifference standard); Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 645 (granting qualified immunity for prison 
officials). 
 92 Mitchell v. Shearrer, 729 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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against cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore did not go on to determine 
whether this right was clearly established at the time of the incident.93 On ap-
peal, Kulkay argued that there were a number of possible Eighth Amendment 
violations and that, when examined in concert with one another, a qualified im-
munity defense should not be allowed.94 The Eighth Circuit dismissed Kulkay’s 
claims because he was not able to show that the prison officials had actual 
knowledge of the dangers posed by the alleged violations, and thus those prison 
officials did not act with deliberate indifference.95  
III. THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD DEFENDED  
IN LIGHT OF THE POLICY MOTIVATIONS BEHIND  
THE DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The deliberate indifference standard can result in prison officials avoiding 
punishment for harms that prisoners endure under their supervision.96 This Part 
begins by focusing on the deliberate indifference standard and its application 
in Kulkay v. Roy, focusing on the fact that this standard makes it less likely that 
prisoners will receive justice from the prison officials charged with their safe-
keeping.97 After briefly reiterating the policy motivations behind qualified im-
munity, this Part argues that the deliberate indifference standard is necessary in 
order to ensure that the defense of qualified immunity is upheld by the support 
of its underlying policy motivations.98   
In Kulkay v. Roy, the immediate result of the deliberate indifference stand-
ard was that prison officials were not held liable for Kulkay’s debilitating inju-
ries, despite being responsible for overseeing inmate safety and well-being at the 
prison.99 Because Kulkay failed to show that the prison officials had actual 
knowledge of the risks of using the beam saw without the safety guard, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case for failure to state a 
claim, and he was denied legal recourse for his injuries.100 Although this result 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 645. There are a number of cases that establish that if one of the prongs of 
the qualified immunity analysis is not met, the court need not be concerned with the other. See Ran-
som v. Grisafe, 790 F.3d 804, 812 n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Fields v. Ab-
bott, 652 F.3d 886, 894 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 94 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5, Kulkay, 847 F.3d 637 (No. 16–1801), 2016 WL 3755732, at *5. 
The alleged violations included: (1) no safety guards on the beam saw; (2) Kulkay not receiving for-
mal training; (3) the prison officials being aware of similar injuries; and (4) these conditions violating 
state and federal regulations. Id. The essence of Kulkay’s argument is that when all of these violations 
are considered together, the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference towards his health and 
safety. Id. 
 95 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 644, 646. 
 96 See Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 645 (8th Cir. 2017) (allowing prison officials to claim quali-
fied immunity on the grounds that the plaintiff did not meet the standard of deliberate indifference). 
 97 See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 108–120 and accompanying text. 
 99 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 645–46. 
 100 Id. at 644–46. 
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may at first appear counterintuitive to the purpose of Eighth Amendment claims, 
which would otherwise grant recourse to plaintiffs in similar situations, the un-
derlying policy motivations behind the defense of qualified immunity make it 
apparent that the standard of deliberate indifference is necessary to give the de-
fense the weight it was intended to have.101 
The standard of deliberate indifference is undoubtedly high, but it affords 
officials the protections that the defense intended to provide in the first place.102 
Without the greater protection afforded by the standard of deliberate indiffer-
ence, it would be much easier to prove that a violation is serious enough to war-
rant an Eighth Amendment violation, and thus officials would constantly be 
forced to face the high burdens of litigation.103 This would result in increased 
risk of financial liability for officials, which the defense of qualified immunity 
seeks to prevent.104 Additionally, without the high standard of deliberate indif-
ference, public officials would become preoccupied by the time and energy bur-
dens associated with discovery and trial.105 Public officials are tasked with mak-
ing important decisions for a number of people at one time and they cannot af-
ford to be distracted by the time and effort associated with defending a law-
suit.106 Having the standard of deliberate indifference in place makes it more 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994) (explaining the standard of deliberate indif-
ference and implying that it makes it more difficult for a public official to be found liable); Forrester 
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (explaining that the main policy motivation behind qualified im-
munity is to allow officials to continue to perform the duties of their job without the distraction of a 
lawsuit); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (implying that without the defense of qualified 
immunity, officials would be more likely to face lawsuits and be distracted from their job duties); 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 432–33 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (explaining that the main 
reason behind an Eighth Amendment claim is to provide a means for an injured party to receive mone-
tary damages). Forrester and Forsyth illustrate the key policy motivations behind the defense of quali-
fied immunity, primarily the need to afford protection to public officials in order to allow them to 
perform their job duties. 484 U.S. at 223; 472 U.S. at 524. 
 102 See supra, note 101 and accompanying text. 
 103 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (discussing the standard of deliberate indifference in greater 
detail); Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007) (clarifying the motivation behind the stand-
ard of deliberate indifference as remaining consistent with the idea that only an “unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain” violates the Eighth Amendment, and implying that this is a higher bar to 
defeat qualified immunity); LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MA-
JOR COMPANIES 1, 2–4 (2010) (discussing the numerical costs of litigation and the burden this impos-
es on litigants). Although this survey looks at company litigation costs and not an individual plain-
tiff’s costs, it still provides some idea of how costly litigation can be. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
supra, at 2–4. The study found that the average company from 2006–2008 paid at least $621,880 in 
discovery costs alone per case. Id. 
 104 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (explaining that an underlying policy motivation 
for qualified immunity is to avoid exposing public officials to financial liability). 
 105 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (explaining the significant costs that accom-
pany litigation and noting that public officials have more important tasks to spend their limited time 
and energy on); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (highlighting the burdens of discovery 
and trial and finding that these burdens are the grounds that support the defense of qualified immunity 
for public officials). 
 106 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (reasoning that exposing public officials to increased litigation 
would result in the officials having less time to spend accomplishing the more important tasks of their 
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difficult for a plaintiff to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, which in 
turn allows public officials to remain focused on their duties.107  
It is particularly important to have this standard of deliberate indifference 
for a qualified immunity defense in the context of prison officials.108 Being a 
prison official is not a glamorous job—it often involves working odd hours and 
dealing with difficult circumstances related to prisoners.109 For example, a job 
posting for a correctional officer at a facility in Faribault, Minnesota, requires 
that applicants be available to work rotating shifts twenty-four hours per day, 
seven days a week.110 Additionally, the yearly salary of these prison officials can 
be as low as $41,080.111 The difficulties that accompany this job necessitate the 
protections afforded by the standard of deliberate indifference; otherwise, there 
may not be people willing to take on the job.112 
The Eighth Circuit has continuously made rulings granting a defense of 
qualified immunity, grounded in the standard of deliberate indifference.113 One 
could argue these rulings are a bad outcome, because plaintiffs who endure some 
harm do not receive damages from the official who indirectly harmed them.114 
                                                                                                                           
job); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 (discussing that the nature of the jobs of public officials warrants the 
defense of qualified immunity). 
 107 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (reasoning that qualified immunity protects public officials from 
the great time burdens that come with defending a lawsuit); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (explaining the 
standard of deliberate indifference and implying that it makes it more difficult for a public official to 
be found liable); Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 646 (showing an example of prison officials being granted quali-
fied immunity when the standard of deliberate indifference was not met). 
 108 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (discussing the standard of deliberate indifference and implicitly 
reasoning that this standard makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to defeat the defense of qualified 
immunity); Franklin v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 160 F. App’x 730, 733–36 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that a 
prison official received qualified immunity when the plaintiff failed to satisfy the standard of deliber-
ate indifference); Warren v. Missouri, 995 F.2d 130, 130 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that the standard of 
deliberate indifference is applied to prison officials); Bibbs v. Armontrout, 943 F.2d 26, 27 (8th Cir. 
1991) (holding that the standard of deliberate indifference was not met by showing the negligence of 
prison officials). 
 109 See Alysia Santo, 16-Hour Shifts, 300 Inmates to Watch, and 1 Lonely Son, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Dec. 22, 2014, 12:41 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/22/16-hour-shifts-
300-inmates-to-watch-and-1-lonely-son. Some prison guards in New Hampshire frequently have to 
work multiple sixteen-hour shifts in a week. Id. 
 110 Correctional Officer Job Bulletin, supra note 65 (stating the hours required of a correctional 
officer). 
 111 Id. This number is based on the minimum hourly salary listed at $20.54 and the assumptions 
that a typical prison official will work a forty-hour week, fifty weeks per year. See id. 
 112 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (explaining the standard of deliberate indifference and implying 
that it makes it more difficult for a public official to be found liable); Santo, supra note 109 (noting 
that a prison official often has to face the difficulties of working sixteen-hour shifts and may be forced 
to deal with rapists and insults from inmates). 
 113 See Stephens v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 198, 200–01 (8th Cir. 1996),(holding that the defendant 
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity); Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31 (granting defendant 
prison officials qualified immunity); Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27 (upholding qualified immunity for prison 
officials because the standard of deliberate indifference was not satisfied). 
 114 See Stephens, 83 F.3d at 200; Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31; Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27. In these three 
cases, the 8th Circuit found for the defendants and thus the plaintiffs did not receive monetary damages 
for his claims. See Stephens, 83 F.3d at 200; Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31; Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27. 
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An allowance for this outcome seemingly contradicts the original intent of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which was to provide injured plaintiffs a legal means to recovery 
for a violation of a constitutional right.115 If public officials are granted qualified 
immunity, as a result of the greater protection afforded by the standard of delib-
erate indifference, those plaintiffs seeking medical or other damages will not be 
made whole for their injuries indirectly caused by the officials.116 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit has recognized that in some instances, a bad 
outcome, such as injured inmates not receiving justice from prison officials, may 
need to be tolerated in order to further establish a commitment to what is other-
wise a good law.117 In Kulkay, the Eighth Circuit correctly adhered to the stand-
ard of deliberate indifference, despite the fact that it meant Kulkay was denied 
monetary damages from the prison officials.118 In doing so, the court properly 
tolerated this seemingly bad outcome in order to cement its commitment to up-
holding the defense of qualified immunity.119 As a result, prison officials in the 
Eighth Circuit are able to continue to perform their job duties and serve the pub-
lic without exposure to frivolous lawsuits and the great time burdens of discov-
ery and trial.120 
CONCLUSION 
Qualified immunity is a defense that is available to various public officials 
in order to afford them an added layer of protection from lawsuit. The standard 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 432–33 (White, J., concurring) (discussing the intent behind § 1983 
claims). 
 116 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504–05 (1978) (discussing the fact that plaintiffs may 
not be able to recover monetary damages if officials are granted immunity). 
 117 See Stephens, 83 F.3d at 200–01 (holding that the standard of deliberate indifference was not met 
and prison officials were therefore entitled to qualified immunity); Warren, 995 F.2d at 130–31 (granting 
qualified immunity to prison officials on the grounds that the plaintiff did not satisfy the standard of 
deliberate indifference); Bibbs, 943 F.2d at 27 (discussing the relationship between the standard of delib-
erate indifference and qualified immunity as they pertain to prison officials). These outcomes are bad 
because they result in injured plaintiffs not receiving monetary damages from the officials that caused the 
harm. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 504–05 (highlighting the point that plaintiffs do not receive monetary com-
pensation if a defendant official is granted immunity). Ultimately, society needs these outcomes in order 
to allow public officials to perform the duties of their job to the highest standard. See Forrester, 484 U.S. 
at 223–24 (stating that the purpose behind qualified immunity is to allow public officials to perform the 
duties of their job without fear of a lawsuit); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (explaining the risks of exposing a 
public official to litigation and justifying affording them qualified immunity). 
 118 Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 645–46. 
 119 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (discussing the underlying reasons and motivations behind quali-
fied immunity and implying a commitment by the Court to uphold the defense); Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 
645–46 (showing a case where prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity, which resulted in 
an injured plaintiff not receiving monetary compensation). 
 120 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223–24 (discussing how qualified immunity allows public officials 
to perform the duties of their job with “full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought 
to guide their conduct”); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (explaining that qualified immunity permits public 
officials to continue to perform their job duties free from the distractions of a lawsuit); Kulkay, 847 
F.3d at 644. 
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of deliberate indifference required to defeat qualified immunity in the prison 
work assignment context is one that undeniably has some downfalls. There are 
times when an injured prisoner will not receive monetary damages from the offi-
cial who either caused the harm or did not take steps to prevent it from occur-
ring. Nevertheless, courts have chosen to adopt this standard for the qualified 
immunity defense in the prison context and have repeatedly made rulings that 
establish it as the law. The courts have relied heavily on several underlying poli-
cy motivations of qualified immunity in doing so, and have made it clear that a 
prisoner needs to show that the official had actual knowledge of the risk of harm 
in order to recover monetary damages. If the high standard of deliberate indiffer-
ence is not met, the prison official will not be liable for the harm. In short, the 
courts have correctly chosen to allow instances where prison officials escape 
liability for injuries endured by prisoners in order to ensure that public officials 
are not overly subjected to the burdens of discovery and trial. 
PETER DILIBERTI 
Preferred Cite: Peter Diliberti, Comment, Cementing Good Law by Tolerating Bad Outcomes: Exam-
ining the Eighth Circuit’s Commitment to Upholding the Defense of Qualified Immunity for Prison 
Officials in Kulkay v. Roy, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 297 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.
edu/bclr/vol59/iss9/297. 
